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2Bargaining with intertemporal maximin payoﬀs
Abstract
We present a new class of dynamic bargaining problems, called
“bargaining problems with intertemporal maximin payoﬀs,” that may
reﬂect sustainability problems having to encompass conﬂicting issues
in the long-run. Each bargainer (or stake-holder) has a representative
indicator, namely a function of the state and decisions, and aims at
maximizing its minimal value over time. Bargaining on sustainability
issues consists in deﬁning the vector of stake-holder’s payoﬀs. We are
interested in deﬁning the set of feasible outcomes of such problems.
This set is interpreted as a support for a social choice of sustainabil-
ity objectives. We introduce a MONDAI condition – Monotonicity of
Dynamics And Indicators – consistent with many economic problems
and, in particular, “environmental economic” sustainability issues. We
characterize the set of feasible outcomes for problems satisfying these
monotonicity properties, and the bargaining solutions under the ax-
ioms of Pareto eﬃciency and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives.
We also provide a “satisﬁcing” common decision rule to achieve any
given solution. We then examine the time-consistency of the solution
under the axioms of Veto Power and Individual Rationality.
Keywords: bargaining theory, dynamics, maximin, monotonicity, feasi-
bility set, sustainability
31 Introduction
We present a new class of dynamic bargaining problems inspired by sustain-
able development issues. A group of stake-holders can agree on a common
sequence of actions (intertemporal path of consumption or investment for
instance), as in Fershtman [1983]. These actions modify the state of the
economy (capital stocks) according to a dynamics representing production
possibilities. Each stake-holder gets an intertemporal payoﬀ which depends
on the resulting economic trajectory. If they do not agree, they get a reference
payoﬀ given by the status-quo, or business-as-usual economic trajectory (this
is the equivalent of the disagreement point of static bargaining problems).
In Fershtman [1983], the intertemporal payoﬀs were given by the discounted
utility criterion. The novelty of the present paper is that we consider in-
tertemporal maximin payoﬀ functions [Solow, 1974, Cairns and Long, 2006,
Long, 2006]. The payoﬀ of each stake-holder is deﬁned as the minimal level
over time of an individual indicator (representing a sustainability issue). The
payoﬀs are not directly transferable between stake-holders as the indicators
can be of diﬀerent nature, with diﬀerent units. At each time, the levels of
the indicators depend on the state of the economy and the commonly agreed
decision at that time.
The set of feasible outcomes represents all the achievable stake-holders
payoﬀs (minimal level of the indicators over time). This set depends on
the economic state and dynamics, which makes the problem environment-
dependent [Roemer, 1986, 1988, Chen and Maskin, 1999], and is not “com-
prehensive.”1 This makes its characterization diﬃcult, which is an obstacle
to the resolution of the bargaining problem.
1The set of feasible outcomes in not comprehensive when having a given payoﬀ vector
in the set does not mean that lower payoﬀs are achievable [Kalai, 1977, Zhou, 1996]. This
can occur in particular when payoﬀs are not transferable between agents. We give a formal
deﬁnition in Section 3.
4Considering the classical axioms of Pareto eﬃciency and Independence of
irrelevant alternatives, we show that the solution of the bargaining problem
is the same as the solution of a more tractable problem based on a com-
prehensive set containing the set of feasible outcomes of the original prob-
lem. In particular, the Pareto frontiers of both set coincide. We characterize
this auxiliary comprehensive set under some monotonicity properties – called
MONDAIk (Monotonicity of the dynamics and k indicators). Roughly speak-
ing, these monotonicity properties correspond to a requirement that capital
stocks are “productive” (in the sense that having more capital stocks makes
it possible to produce more, and does not reduce the payoﬀ of any stake-
holder), and that some (not all) indicators depend in a monotonic way on
the action (i.e., decreasing), which makes the stake-holders having payoﬀs
depending on these indicators belong to some “interest group.” When there
is such an interest group, the Pareto frontier of the set of feasible outcomes
is shown to be of a lower dimension than the number of stake-holders.
We then provide an interpretation of the bargaining problem in terms of
social choice, and describe the corresponding social planner problem (Social
Welfare Function). We also characterize the evolution of the bargaining solu-
tion over time, showing that it exhibits “time-monotonicity” (the payoﬀ of all
stake-holders is non-decreasing over time) if stake-holders are “individually
rational” and have a “veto power.”
To our knowledge, this class of problems has never been studied. Our
paper is therefore an original contribution to the bargaining literature. The
closest analyses are that of Fershtman [1983], who studied the same kind
of dynamic bargaining on a sequence of actions, but with payoﬀs deﬁned
by discounted utility, and that of Long [2006], who considered a dynamic
game with intertemporal maximin preferences. This latter problem diﬀers
from ours as each player has his own decision, and the solution depends on
the strategic interactions between players, relating his paper to the ﬁeld of
5dynamic games while we adopt the bargaining theory approach.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the
motivation for studying such dynamic bargaining problems, and their inter-
pretation in terms of sustainable development. In Section 3, we present the
general dynamic bargaining problem, the axioms, and the equivalence of its
solution with that of another, more tractable problem. All results are ob-
tained without any speciﬁcation on the functional forms. In Section 4, we
introduce the MONDAIk monotonicity properties, and characterize the set of
outcomes of the auxiliary problem, along with a “satisﬁcing” feedback deci-
sion rule making it possible to achieve any Pareto solution. We then provide,
in Section 5, the social choice problem equivalent to our bargaining problem,
and examine the time-consistency of solutions. We conclude in Section 6 on
future research avenues. Proofs and examples are given in the appendix.
2 Motivation and settings
The new class of dynamic bargaining problems introduced in this paper is
inspired by sustainable development issues. This section ﬁrst describes the
general issue at stake, and then relates this issue and the proposed problem
to the existing literature on bargaining.
Sustainable development issues are dynamical and encompass several (po-
tentially conﬂicting) dimensions, such as environmental and economic issues.
In practice, multicriteria approaches based on sustainability indicators and
thresholds are used.2 Sustainability indicators, depending on the state and
2For example, the climate change issue is addressed by deﬁning a limit thresholds for
GHG atmospheric concentration [UN, 1998]. Regarding biodiversity, a somehow similar
approach is applied worldwide, with the creation of reserves to protect natural habitat
of species [UN, 2010]. These reserves are constraints on the development of land-use
for alternative economic use such as agriculture or urban development. Other examples
include minimal stock size for ﬁsheries [FAO, 2005], or thresholds for pollution of air and
6decisions of the economy, follow the dynamic evolution of quantities repre-
senting the various issues (e.g., the per capita GDP, the employment rate,
the greenhouse gases (GHG) atmospheric concentration, the spawning stock
biomass of a targeted species in a ﬁshery). Thresholds represent constraints
which should not be overshot (e.g., minimal per capita income, minimal em-
ployment, maximal GHG concentration, minimal stock for a ﬁshery). These
thresholds are chosen socially.3 “Any social decision is the ultimate out-
come of some kind of collective bargaining process” [Kalai et al., 1976, p.233].
There are necessary trade-oﬀs between these environmental issues and other
issues, e.g., economic development. We are interested in representing these
trade-oﬀs and the underlying bargaining process. We argue that the deﬁni-
tion of thresholds that sustainability indicators should not overshoot can be
seen as a bargaining problem, the thresholds being interpreted as the payoﬀs
of some representative stake-holders (being they real, or virtual as is public
opinion).
Bargaining problems have been widely studied since their formulation
by Nash [1950, 1953]. Traditional bargaining theory assumes that p stake-
holders may agree on an allocation within a set of feasible outcomes, or end
up at a disagreement point. The usual assumption in static bargaining theory
water. These approaches are based on quantities (indicators and thresholds) rather than
on prices. From an economic point of view, damage or beneﬁt functions could be deﬁned
and used for cost-beneﬁt analyses. However, as sustainability concerns are often related to
non-market goods whose value is diﬃcult to assess, and involve future generations which
are not present to state their preferences, such an approach is not always possible and
physical indicators are used [Stiglitz et al., 2009]. As there is no “easy” common currency
between the various issues at stake, each issue is tackled on its own.
3These thresholds often have scientiﬁc basis (as the IPCC advices for the climate change
issue), but also account for economic and social issues. A clear argument showing that
sustainability thresholds are socially chosen is that they diﬀer between countries, and in
particular with the level of development. Environmental standards are higher in developed
countries with high income than in developing countries [Dasgupta et al., 2001].
7is to consider that the set of feasible outcomes is a compact and convex (and
usually comprehensive) subset of Rp. In static problems, deﬁning such a set
is not an issue. In particular, if the cooperative solution is implemented and
monetary transfers between stake-holders are possible, the Pareto frontier of
the feasibility set is deﬁned by a “budget” line. For some problems however,
this set may me non-convex, which makes the deﬁnition of solutions more
diﬃcult [Zhou, 1996, Mariotti, 2000, Denicol` o and Mariotti, 2000]. There
are several solutions to the bargaining problem, depending on the deﬁnition
of preferences over feasible outcomes [Border and Segal, 1997]. Pareto eﬃ-
ciency implies that solutions are located on the frontier of the set of feasible
outcomes.
Bargaining problems based on a dynamical system have received less at-
tention than static problems.4 Fershtman [1983] introduced “dynamic bar-
gaining problems” in which stakeholders have to agree on a time path of
actions, i.e., a common set of decision parameters for the system, and have
intertemporal payoﬀs depending on the economic path. In such dynamic
bargaining problems, the set of feasible outcomes is not straightforward to
characterize. In particular, it depends on the dynamics of the system, which
will strongly inﬂuence the results. The usual assumption on the existence
of a convex set of feasible outcomes is thus stronger than in the static case
and, in the dynamic case, the description of this set is an issue in and of
itself. This is particularly true when no (intertemporal) transfers between
stake-holders are possible, as in the sustainability issue described above.
Following Fershtman [1983], we consider a dynamic bargaining problem in
4Rubinstein [1982] considered the cost of bargaining to deﬁne equilibrium solutions in
repeated propositions. In the dynamic framework, attention has been devoted either to
repeated or iterative static bargaining, such as price negotiation, or to dynamic games.
In dynamic games, each player has a decision parameter [Jørgensen and Zaccour, 2007],
which is not the case when stake-holders bargain over a set of decision parameters for a
dynamic system.
8which stake-holders have to agree on a time path of actions. Fershtman [1983]
considered discounted utility payoﬀ functions. In the sustainability issue, the
discounted utility criterion has been criticized and qualiﬁed as a “dictator-
ship of the present” [Chichilnisky, 1996]. An alternative criterion proposed to
address the sustainability issue is the maximin [Solow, 1974], which treats all
generations with anonymity. In an economy using sustainability indicators,
what is sustained (i.e., supported from below, literally) is the minimal level
of the indicators over time. The usual formulation of a maximin problem
is in utilitarian terms, but the maximin criterion can also be applied to the
sustainment of environmental indicators [Cairns and Long, 2006]. We thus
assume that stake-holders have maximin intertemporal payoﬀs depending on
the minimal level over time of an indicator.5 Such formalization results in
a new class of dynamic bargaining problems in which payoﬀs are not trans-
ferable between stake-holders [Kalai and Samet, 1985]. We are interested in
bargaining problems involving a dynamic system and several stake-holders
whose intertemporal payoﬀ are represented by maximin functions. Given the
initial state of the system, we aim at deﬁning the set of feasible outcomes of
our dynamic problem, and the solutions of a bargaining problem satisfying
the axioms of Pareto eﬃciency and Independence to irrelevant alternatives.
The reader would note that this problem is slightly diﬀerent from the
issue of deﬁning thresholds that sustainability indicators should not over-
shoot, which was the problem described at the beginning of this section.
However, we shall prove that the two problems are in fact very interrelated.
They have the same solution, and their Pareto frontiers coincide. In terms
of economic interpretations, this means that addressing sustainability using
indicators and thresholds is equivalent to considering (virtual) stake-holders
5Without loss of generality, it is always possible to take the negative level of an indicator
representing a “bad,” such as pollution, to be able to consider that the payoﬀ is the minimal
level over time of the indicator.
9with intertemporal maximin payoﬀ.
How the society makes its ﬁnal choice among the set of feasible outcomes
is beyond the scope of this paper. We however emphasize the correspondence
between intertemporal dynamic multi-objective problems and dynamic bar-
gaining, and its implications on the deﬁnition of sustainability thresholds.
We refer to the corresponding social criterion for sustainable development
and interpret the solution of the bargaining problem in terms of the under-
lying social choice rule. The kind of problem described here can be used
to i) deﬁne the set of negotiation between stake-holders having intertempo-
ral maximin utility functions, ii) deﬁne the distributional possibilities of a
policy maker between such stake-holders, and then describe the necessary
trade-oﬀs between sustainability issues to be satisﬁed over time, and iii) de-
ﬁne the decision rule to be implemented to achieve a given Pareto eﬃcient
outcome.
3 Bargaining problem with intertemporal max-
imin payoﬀ
3.1 Overview of the bargaining problem
Suppose that p ≥ 2 stake-holders identiﬁed by i = 1,...,p have to agree on a
common decision which will have consequences on their individual payoﬀ. In
an intertemporal context where time t is discrete and runs as t = t0,t0+1,...,





where each action a(t) is taken in a set A. Stake-holders’ payoﬀs will depend
on that sequence.
Now, consider that the sequence of decisions and the payoﬀs are related by





. Past decisions inﬂuence the dynamic state of the economy,





each period, x(t) belongs to the state space X.
For i = 1,...,p, an indicator Ii : X×A  → R, depending on the economic
state x(t) and decision a(t), represents the measurement of the ith bargainer
interest at each time t. Each indicator has its own unit, which does not allow
direct transfers between bargainers.





, equal to the minimal level over time of their indi-
cator. The stake-holders bargain on a sequence of actions a( ) which, given
the initial economic state x0, deﬁnes an outcome within a set of feasible out-
comes. Note that the bargained sequence of actions a( ) can be given by an
open-loop decision, namely a function of time a(t), or by a state-dependent
decision rule, namely a mapping a : ×X  → A giving each decision as a





3.2 The dynamic model
The evolution of the system is described by a nonlinear discrete-time dynam-








, t = t0,t0 + 1,...
x(t0) = x0 given,
(1)
where the state variable x(t) belongs to the ﬁnite dimensional state space
X ⊂ RnX, the decision variable a(t) is an element of the decision set A ⊂ RnA
while the dynamics g maps X × A into X (for the sake of simplicity, we
consider the time-autonomous case).
When the sequence of actions is deﬁned by a Markovian feedback rule,





, one gets the closed-loop dynamics

   












Given a bargained sequence of actions a( ), the intertemporal payoﬀ of
the ith stake-holder is deﬁned according to
J





i = 1,...,p (3)
where Ii : X × A  → R is an instantaneous indicator (i.e., a measurement
of interest for the ith stake-holder). Bargainer i aims at maximizing his
intertemporal payoﬀ, which leads to consider a maximin problem.
3.3 The bargaining problem
A bargaining problem is characterized by a set of feasible outcomes and a
disagreement point. A bargaining solution consists in choosing a particular
element of the set, under some axioms. The more restrictive the axioms, the
more reduced the possible solutions.
In our context, both the set of feasible outcomes and the disagreement
point depend on the initial state of the economy and on the dynamics of
the system. They thus depend on the economic environment.6 Moreover, a
bargaining solution, which is a vector of payoﬀs receiving the agreement of
all the stake-holders, is only deﬁned by an associated sequence of actions to
achieve it.
6Classical bargaining theory is based only up on the shape of the set of feasible out-
comes. Roemer [1986, 1988] criticized this approach as it does not account for the eco-
nomic environment and the nature of the goods to be shared. Chen and Maskin [1999]
enriched the economic context of the bargaining problem by considering the possibility of
production. We go one step further by considering the whole economic dynamics, in an
intertemporal framework.
12The set of feasible outcomes. The set F(x0) of all feasible outcomes
starting from x0 is the collection of achievable intertemporal payoﬀs (3):
F(x0) :=

                     
                     
θ = (θ1,...,θp) ∈ R
p






















∃ (a(t0),a(t0 + 1),...) and
(x(t0),x(t0 + 1),...)
satisfying x(t0) = x0










∀ i = 1,...,p.

                     
                     
. (4)
Note that this set is not necessarily comprehensive (i.e., a lower set7) in
the space Rp.
Disagreement point. If there is no agreement, the economy stays on the




The axioms. We assume that the bargaining solution satisﬁes the axioms
of Pareto eﬃciency and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives deﬁned as
follows.
Definition 1 (Weak Pareto Efficiency)
Let A ⊂ Rp be given. A vector of outcomes θ = (θ1,...,θp) ∈ A is said to
be weakly Pareto eﬃcient in A if, for any σ = (σ1,...σp) such that σi > θi,
for all i = 1,...,p, one has σ / ∈ A.
All weakly Pareto eﬃcient points are on the boundary of A. We shall
denote by Pw
A the set of all weak Pareto boundary points of A.
7If a point (θ1,...,θp) is in F(x0), a point (θ′
1,...,θ′
p) ≤ (θ1,...,θp) (component-wise)
may not be in F(x0), i.e., may not be feasible.
13Definition 2 ((Strong) Pareto Efficiency)
A vector of outcomes θ = (θ1,...,θp) ∈ A ⊂ Rp is (strongly) Pareto eﬃcient
– Pareto eﬃcient for short – in A if, for any σ = (σ1,...σp) such that σi ≥ θi
for all i = 1,...,p and σi > θi for some i, one has σ / ∈ A.
We shall denote by PA the set of all Pareto boundary points of A. Note
that PA ⊂ Pw
A. An outcome (θ1,...,θp) ∈ Pw
A\PA is dominated in the
sense that one can increase the payoﬀ of at least one stake-holder without
decreasing that of the others.
Definition 3 (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives)
Consider two sets A and A′ such that A′ ⊂ A. A bargaining solution satisﬁes
the property of independence of irrelevant alternatives if, whenever a solution
σ of the bargaining problem on A satisﬁes σ ∈ A′, then σ is also the solution
of the bargaining problem on A′.
This axiom means that, if the solution of a bargaining problem belongs to
a subset of the set of feasible outcomes, the solution of the bargaining problem
on this subset is the same as the solution on the whole set. Reducing the set
feasible outcomes by suppressing “irrelevant alternatives” (i.e., elements of
the set which were not solution of the bargaining problem) does not change
the solution.
3.4 An auxiliary bargaining problem.
As we consider Pareto eﬃcient solutions, we are interested in the Pareto
frontier of the set F(x0). As this set is not comprehensive, we rather turn
toward the following more practical set of satisﬁcing outcomes. We shall
see that this set deﬁnes an alternative problem which has the same (strong)
Pareto solutions as our bargaining problem.
14Another bargaining problem: satisﬁcing outcomes. We deﬁne the
set of satisﬁcing outcomes8 S(x0) starting from x0 as follows
S(x0) :=

                  
                  
θ = (θ1,...,θp) ∈ R
p
 



















∃ (a(t0),a(t0 + 1),...) and
(x(t0),x(t0 + 1),...)
satisfying x(t0) = x0









≥ θi ∀ i = 1,...,p

                  
                  
.
(5)
The only diﬀerence between the above satisﬁcing outcomes set (5) and the
feasible outcomes set (4) is an equality replaced by an inequality in the
ﬁnal lines of their deﬁnitions. Notice that if θ ∈ S(x0) then, θ′ ≤ θ (with
the componentwise order) also belongs to S(x0) and therefore, this set is
comprehensive (lower set). The following proposition states that this set




This result is obvious.
Equivalence of solutions. The following Proposition 2 states that the
Pareto solutions of the original bargaining problem (i.e., part of frontier of
8Satisﬁcing means that these outcomes are guaranteed in the sense actual payoﬀ is
greater than or equal to these levels. Replaced in our initial motivation of deﬁning the
necessary trade-oﬀs in the deﬁnition of sustainability thresholds, this set corresponds the
the set of achievable sustainability thresholds.
15F(x0)) correspond to the Pareto frontier of the set S(x0).
Proposition 2
The Pareto frontiers of F(x0) and S(x0) are the same. That is
PF(x0) = PS(x0) .
The interpretation of this proposition is quite simple. When thresh-
olds (θ1,...,θp) ∈ S(x0) are Pareto eﬃcient, these thresholds are actually
achieved in the sense that the constraint is eventually binding. They are
thus feasible outcomes for the dynamic bargaining problem with intertem-
poral maximin payoﬀs. In fact, the following proposition states that the
solution of a bargaining on S(x0) is the same as the solution of a bargaining
problem on F(x0).
Proposition 3
Under the axioms of Pareto eﬃciency and Independence of Irrelevant Al-
ternatives, and given Propositions 1 and 2, the solution of the bargaining
problem on S(x0) is also solution of the bargaining problem on F(x0).
This result means that it is equivalent, from the solution point of view, to
bargain on minimal values of an indicator or on a threshold which should not
be overshot. As we stated in Section 2, there is a strong link between the two
problems. An interesting remark is that addressing the sustainability issue
by deﬁning thresholds which should be overshot by sustainability indicators
is equivalent to considering (virtual) stake-holders having intertemporal max-
imin payoﬀs.
The general setting of the bargaining problem does not allow us to dis-
cuss its solution in more detail without specifying some general properties of
the functions under consideration. In particular, one needs to know the set
of feasible outcomes. In the next section, we show that, under some mono-
tonicity properties, it is possible to compute S(x0). According to proposition
163, the solution of the bargaining problem on this set is the solution of the
bargaining problem on F(x0).
4 The monotonic case
In this section, we study the dynamic bargaining problem with intertempo-
ral maximin payoﬀ under some monotonicity assumptions for the dynamics
and the indicators. We name these assumptions MONDAIk (MONotonicity of
Dynamics And k Indicators). These assumptions have signiﬁcant economic
interpretations. In particular, they can represent environmental economic
problems, related to sustainability issues.
4.1 Monotonicity assumptions
Monotonic dynamics. Some dynamic models have the following qualita-
tive properties (ceteris paribus): (i) the higher the state vector at a period
is, the higher it is at the following period; (ii) the higher the decision at a
period is, the lower the state vector is at the following period. This is the
case for many economic problems in which capital stocks are productive9 and
consumption comes from foregone investment. As we put a particular focus
on environmental issues, let us emphasize that these properties are satisﬁed,
for instance, for problems of air quality dynamics and pollutant emissions10,
or natural resource stocks (renewable or not) and extraction/harvesting.11
9It requires that the various components of the capital vector have no negative eﬀect
one on the others.
10The better the air quality at one period, the better at the following period (ceteris
paribus). And the higher the pollutant emission at one period, the worse the air quality
at the following period. This works for the climate change issue and greenhouse gases
emissions, taking the negative level of CO2 atmospheric concentration as a state.
11The larger the resource stock at one period, the larger at the following. The larger
the extraction or harvesting, the lower the resource stock at the following period. Note
17Monotonic indicators and interest groups. With respect to the indi-
cators, we can also exhibit such monotonicity properties. If all capital stocks
are deﬁned as “goods,” indicators will usually increase with the state, i.e.,
the larger the state vector, the higher the indicators.12 Some indicators may
also be monotonically responding to the decisions. This is the case for envi-
ronmental indicators which are monotonically decreasing with the decisions
such as pollutant emissions or resource extraction.13
In order to represent the mentioned above behaviors, we supply the state
space X ⊂ RnX and the decision space A ⊂ RnA with the componentwise
order: y′ ≥ y if and only if each component of y′ = (y′
1,...,y′
d) is greater
or equal than to the corresponding component of y = (y1,...,yd). We say
that a mapping f : X × A −→ Rd, deﬁned for state and decision variables,
with values in Rd (we will use d = nX for the dynamics case, and d = 1
for the indicator case), is increasing with respect to the state if it satisﬁes
∀ (x,x′,a) ∈ X × X × A, x′ ≥ x ⇒ f(x′,a) ≥ f(x,a), and is decreasing with
respect to the decision if ∀ (x,a,a′) ∈ X×A×A, a′ ≥ a ⇒ f(x,a′) ≤ f(x,a).
Obviously, according to the previous deﬁnition, if a function does not depend
on the state or the decision, it will be both increasing and decreasing with
respect to such variable.
that these assumptions are not satisﬁed for multispecies ecological models when there is
a prey-predator relationship, as a larger predator stock may reduce the next period prey
stock.
12This is true for economic indicators, which may depend for instance on capital stocks,
knowledge / human capital, or infrastructures. This is also true for ecological indicators
as long as the capital stocks are properly deﬁned, by accounting for “bads” (pollution for
instance) by their opposite.
13Note that economic indicators may be monotonically increasing with the decisions,
but not necessarily. For example, ﬁshermen may favor an increase of ﬁshing eﬀort as long
as it increases their proﬁt, but no more when the associated cost is higher than the beneﬁt
from ﬁshing.
18MONDAIk property: Monotonicity of the dynamics and k indicators.
Definition 4 (MONDAIk)
Let k ∈ {1,...,p − 1}. A dynamic bargaining problem with intertemporal
maximin payoﬀs is MONDAIk if:
• the dynamics g : X × A −→ X is increasing in the state variable and
decreasing in the decision;
• all the indicators Ii : X × A −→ R are continuous, and are increasing
in the state variable;
• the ﬁrst k indicators I1,...,Ik are decreasing in the decision variable.
In the previous deﬁnition, all the indicators are increasing with the state.
All capital stocks are valuable (or at least not damageable). The stake-
holders of the ﬁrst group {1,...,k} have a particular interest in having the
decision always as small as possible (e.g., GHG emissions, deforestation, ﬁsh-
ing eﬀort), which is interpreted as a “pro-environmental group” in our envi-
ronmental issue context. Their payoﬀ is always decreasing when the decision
variables increase. On the contrary, the second group of indicators does not
depend on the decision in a particular way (or some of the indicators may
be increasing with the decision, in opposition to the indicators of the ﬁrst
group). The stake-holders k + 1,...,p are called outsiders of the interest
group {1,...,k} as they have no systematic “monotonic” interest in the de-
cision level.14
14The particular MONDAIp−1 case (all indicators are environmental except one, inter-
preted as an economic instantaneous payoﬀ such as utility or consumption) has an inter-
esting economic interpretation. This case actually corresponds to a well-known problem in
economics, namely a maximin under environmental constraints [Cairns and Long, 2006].
194.2 Satisﬁcing decision rule
In what follows, we will consider a scalar decision belonging to an interval
A = [a♭,a♯].
For a vector of satisﬁcing outcomes θ = (θ1,...,θp) ∈ S(x0) – under the
monotony assumptions MONDAIk – we shall describe a common decision rule
which ensures to obtain at least these thresholds. This rule is parametrized
by guaranteed payoﬀs of the outsiders of the interest group.
Proposition 4
Assume that the bargaining problem is MONDAIk, for some k ∈ {1,...,p−1}.





θk+1:p(x) := inf{a ∈ A | Ii(x,a) ≥ θi , i = k + 1,...,p} . (6)
Then, for any θ1:k ∈ Rk, the vector of thresholds θ = (θ1:k,θk+1:p) belongs to
S(x0) if and only if a⋆
θk+1:p is a common decision rule that allows to obtain at
least θ, starting from x0.
The interest of the previous result is twofold. On the one hand, if
(θ1,...,θp) ∈ S(x0), the trajectory x⋆( ) starting from the initial state x0











t = t0,t0 + 1,...,
(7)
guarantee the given outcomes. On the other hand, given a partial set of out-
comes θk+1:p, if the economic trajectory (7) deﬁned by a⋆
θk+1:p does not achieve
a given complementary set of outcomes ˜ θ1:k, no other rule will. It means that
outcomes (˜ θ1:k,θk+1:p) cannot be guaranteed, namely (˜ θ1:k,θk+1:p) / ∈ S(x0).
15Notice that a⋆
θk+1:p(x) is not deﬁned for those states x such that {a ∈ A | Ii(x,a) ≥
θi, i = k + 1,...,p} = ∅.
204.3 Interest group and low-dimensional Pareto frontier
Thanks to the result of Proposition 4, we shall provide a way to describe the
set of satisﬁcing outcomes S(x0).
Proposition 5
If the dynamics g and the indicators I1,...,Ip are MONDAIk for some k ∈
{1,...,p − 1} then the set of satisﬁcing outcomes is given by
S(x0) = {θ = (θ1:k,θk+1:p) ∈ R
p | θ1:k ≤ Θ1:k(θk+1:p,x0)} (8)











i = 1,...,k . (9)
Here above, the decision rule a⋆
θk+1:p is given by (6) and the state trajectory
x⋆( ) by the closed loop dynamics (2).
Equality (8) establishes that the set of satisﬁcing thresholds is param-
eterized by the p − k outcomes of the outsiders. Indeed, the outcomes
θ = (Θ1:k(θk+1:p,x0),θk+1:p), when θk+1:p covers diﬀerent values on Rp−k,
allow to compute the set S(x0) by the relation (deduced from Proposition 5)




  S(x0) =
 






− is the p dimensional negative octant R
p
− = {(σ1,...,σp) | σi ≤
0, i = 1,...,p}. Thus, the set of satisﬁcing outcomes S(x0) is obtained
by means of   S(x0) which is more tractable to compute. Figure 1 illustrates
how to compute   S(x0) and therefore S(x0). The ﬁgure corresponds to a case
with p = 3 and k = 2. Taking a⋆
θ3(x) = inf{a|I(x,a) ≥ θ3}, one can compute







Figure 1: Satisﬁcing outcomes parameterized by threshold θ3.
Moreover, as we will establish in the next section, the set   S(x0) is strongly
related to the Pareto frontier of S(x0) and then (from Proposition 2), with
the Pareto frontier of feasible outcomes F(x0) of the bargaining problem.
4.4 Pareto bargaining solutions
Proposition 5 implies that the outcomes θ = (Θ1:k(θk+1:p,x0),θk+1:p), when
the outsiders’s thresholds θk+1:p covers diﬀerent values on Rp−k, are related
to the Pareto outcomes (weak and strong: see deﬁnitions 1 and 2) of S(x0)
in the MONDAI framework as it is established in the following result.16
Proposition 6
If the bargaining problem is MONDAIk, for some k ∈ {1,...,p − 1}, then
PS(x0) ⊂   S(x0) ⊂ P
w
S(x0),
16Note that, if the set of feasible outcomes is smooth and strictly convex, both weak
and strong Pareto frontier coincide, and are fully characterized by   S(x0).
22where   S(x0) is given by (10).
As the set   S(x0) is fully characterized, it is now possible to give the
solution of the dynamic bargaining problem with intertemporal maximin
payoﬀ under the MONDAIk assumption.
Proposition 7
For MONDAIk dynamic bargaining problems with intertemporal maximin pay-
oﬀs, and under the axioms of Pareto eﬃciency and Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives, given Propositions 2 and 6, the solution of the bargaining prob-
lem on F(x0) is the solution of the bargaining problem on   S(x0).
Our description of the Pareto optimal solutions encompasses the informa-
tion on the economic context and economic dynamics, as the set of feasible
outcomes F(x0) accounts for the dynamics, state and decisions [Roemer,
1988]. In particular, we have shown that, with an interest group of k stake-
holders (k ∈ {1,...,p − 1}), the dimension of the Pareto frontier of our
dynamic bargaining problem is lower than or equal to p − k + 1.
5 Discussion
The problem presented in this paper raises several new theoretical issues.
We would like to put emphasis on two of them: the interpretation of the
bargaining solution as a social choice issue, and the time-consistency of a
particular solution of the bargaining problem.
5.1 Social choice: equivalent sustainability criterion
How the society makes its ﬁnal choice among the Pareto eﬃcient solutions
PF(x0) is beyond the scope of this paper. It is however worthwhile to note
that there is an underlying criterion representing the choice of sustainabil-
23ity thresholds corresponding to the solution of the bargaining problem de-
scribed in this paper. Given the equivalence of Pareto solutions of problem
(4) and (5) (Proposition 2), the bargained solution corresponds to a so-
cial choice of sustainability thresholds. Any Pareto solution of our bargain-
ing problem can be the solution of a “social welfare ordering” represented
by a strictly increasing real-valued function which obeys the Pareto princi-
ple [Denicol` o and Mariotti, 2000, Mariotti, 2000]. A criterion introduced by
[Martinet, 2011] describes the choice of sustainability thresholds. It is based
on a “social welfare function” W(θ1,...,θp) ranking all alternative thresh-
olds, where W is increasing in all its arguments. The criterion reads
maxW(θ1,...,θp)








≥ θi , ∀i = 1,...,p, ∀t = t0,t0 + 1,...
which is equivalent to
maxW(θ1,...,θp) (11)
s.t. (θ1,...,θp) ∈ S(x0).
This criterion is interpreted as a generalized maximin criterion. It is the
sustainability criterion which corresponds to the dynamic bargaining problem
described in this paper. The solution belongs to the set of Pareto eﬃcient
satisﬁcing outcomes PS(x0), and thus to the set of Pareto eﬃcient feasible
outcomes PF(x0).
Any solution of the bargaining problem (i.e., any bargaining mechanism)
has an equivalent in the social choice problem (11), for some welfare function.
For instance, the preference over the sustainability issue (thresholds) may
correspond to the weight associated to the outcome of each stake-holder
(i.e., the importance of the sustainability issue is related to some bargaining
24power).17
5.2 Evolution of the feasibility set and improvement
of outcomes over time
Contrary to static bargaining problems, breaking the agreement does not
bring the stake-holders back to the initial situation as the state of the econ-
omy evolves over time (and thus the set of feasible outcomes). Fershtman
[1983] is concerned with the stability of the bargaining solution for dynamic
bargaining problems. In his model, where stake-holders have intertemporal
payoﬀs given by discounted utility, one stake-holder may consider breaking
the agreement at some time t > t0 if he has received most of his planned
payoﬀ at that time. In our model, the stability issue is also a present: stake-
holders may want to bargain again after some time.
Consider a bargained sequence of actions a( ). Each stake-holder’s payoﬀ












17In the sustainability context, the ﬁnal outcome cannot be independent of the issue at
stake. Sustainability raises equity issues, both between generations and between concerns
of diﬀerent dimensions. Roemer [1986, 1988] argues that bargaining theory is not suﬃcient
to address distributive justice, mainly because it is, in its original formulation, “context
free” and neglects preferences and needs. In our approach, sustainability thresholds can be
interpreted as minimal rights to be guaranteed to all generations, which may be deﬁned
according to some basic needs. Note also that we fully consider the economic environ-
ment (the set of feasible outcomes depends on the state x(t), and economic dynamics).
Roemer [1986, 1988] showed that the welfare egalitarian mechanism is the only mechanism
to satisfy the set of axioms he proposed. This corresponds to a Rawlsian conception of jus-
tice. Our problem corresponds to some generalized maximin approach in an intertemporal
framework.










Definition 5 (Veto Power)
The bargaining problem is constrained by “veto power” if, at any time period
t ≥ 0 along the trajectory generated by a decision rule a(x(t)), any of the p
stake-holders can veto a change in the decision rule.
Under the axiom of Veto Power, any stake-holder can dismiss an alterna-
tive path of action.
Definition 6 (Individual Rationality)
A bargaining solution satisﬁes the property of Individual Rationality if, the
payoﬀ of any stake-holder is greater than or equal to that of the disagreement
point.
Under Individual Rationality, no stake-holder should accept an alternative
decision rule reducing his intertemporal payoﬀ.
Along any given trajectory, the outcomes can only increase. The vector
(Ja
1(t),...,Ja
p(t)) deﬁnes a new disagreement point if bargaining takes place
again at time t. This disagreement point corresponds to the actual payoﬀs
along the initial bargained trajectory.19 The set of feasible outcomes is de-
ﬁned by F(x(t)), according to (4). The stake-holders then face a new problem
at time t. Bargaining should take place again if the (dynamic) disagreement
point is not on the Pareto frontier of (dynamic) feasibility set F(x(t)).
We now consider the case of such a re-bargaining. If stake-holders have a
veto power and under the axiom of Individual Rationality, they can rule out
18The payoﬀs J
a( )
i (t) being deﬁned by eq. (3) computed along the trajectory deﬁned by
the initial state x0, the dynamics (1), and a given bargained decision path a(.).
19Note that, as this vector increases over time, some stake-holder may have interest to
delay the bargaining process in order to have a higher disagreement outcome. Considering
such temporal strategies is behind the scope of this paper.
26any path of action which reduces their outcome. Under these assumptions,
we can prove that the solution of the dynamic bargaining is monotonic, in
the sense that it is not decreasing over time.
Proposition 8 (Time monotonicity)
Assuming Veto power and Individual Rationality, when time passes and the
economic state evolves, neither stake-holder’s payoﬀ falls when bargaining
again.
The proof of this proposition is immediate. It shows that, if bargain-
ing takes place again at some time t > t0, the outcomes can only increase,
as stake-holders can remain on the initial path by vetoing any alternative
path. Implementing time-monotonic solution is then required when Individ-
ual Rationality and veto are considered. This gives us an equivalent of the
conclusion by Kalai and Samet [1985], but in an intertemporal framework.
It is interesting to note that, if we do not assume the property of Veto
Power, as it can be the case if there is no actual stake-holder standing for a
sustainability issue, or if we consider the equivalent Social Choice Problem
(in which the decision-maker can reduce the outcome of some stake-holders to
increase that of some others if this decision increases the Social Welfare), the
solution does not necessarily satisfy time-monotonicity. In the sustainability
context, it would mean that some environmental standards or objectives may
be reduced when the set of feasible outcome evolves. In a sense, it may not
be an issue, as society’s choice may change, and new trade-oﬀs may be made,
when the economic context and associated opportunities change.20
20For instance, the ceiling constraint on greenhouse gases atmospheric concentrations
may change in several decades.
276 Conclusion
We introduced a new class of dynamic bargaining problems, in which stake-
holders have to agree on a time path of actions which inﬂuence the dynamic
state of the economy. The payoﬀ of stake-holders is deﬁned as the minimal
level over time of some indicators depending on the evolution of the economic
state and decisions (intertemporal maximin criterion). We showed that, in
this kind of bargaining problems, the set of feasible outcomes is not easy to
deﬁne, in particular because it is not a comprehensive set. Looking for Pareto
eﬃcient solutions, we showed that the solution of the bargaining problem can
be obtained by studying an auxiliary problem (involving a comprehensive
set).
In dynamic bargaining problems, the shape of outcome possibilities de-
pends on the dynamics of the system. In particular, we showed that the
set of Pareto eﬃcient outcomes can be determined under some monotonicity
properties, and we exhibit a common decision rule to achieve any solution.
Regarding the sustainability issue that motivated us, this decision rule is in-
tuitively interpreted as a conservative approach to protect the environment
given non-environmental outcomes. When there are “interest groups,” the
Pareto frontier of the set is of a lower dimension than the number of issues,
meaning that the payoﬀs of the interest group members are linked. From a
practical point of view, this makes the computation of the Pareto solutions
easier.
We describe the corresponding social choice problem, and sustainability
criterion. This is the generalized maximin criterion introduced by Martinet
[2011]. We also show that, under “individual rationality” axiom and “veto
power”, the bargaining solution is “time-monotonic,” i.e., none stake-holder
has his payoﬀ decreasing over time. This is not the case when the veto con-
dition is dropped, or if one considers the “social welfare function” maximiza-
28tion. In the sustainability debate, it means that environmental objectives
can be reduced over time.
Future research could focus on the analysis of time-consistent solutions
when there is no Veto Power. Another interesting issue would be to consider
intertemporal bargaining problems with stake-holders having diﬀerent forms
of intertemporal payoﬀ (e.g., some have discounted utility payoﬀs and some
others have maximin).
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.
For proving PF(x0) = PS(x0) let us start showing the inclusion PS(x0) ⊂
PF(x0).
First, we claim that PS(x0) ⊂ F(x0). For (θ1,...,θp) ∈ PS(x0) ⊂ S(x0)
there exists a trajectory of decisions a( ) and states x( ), starting from x0,





Assuming (θ1,...,θp) / ∈ F(x0) would mean that there is no trajectory




= θi for all i = 1,...,p.
That implies that along the trajectories previously considered, at least one






i > θi. Hence, (θ1,,...,θ′
i ...,θp) ∈ S(x0),
which is in contradiction with (θ1,...,θi ...,θp) ∈ PS(x0), concluding then
(θ1,...,θp) ∈ F(x0).
Now, for (θ1,...,θp) ∈ PS(x0) ⊂ F(x0), if we assume (θ1,...,θp) / ∈ PF(x0),
there exists some i ∈ {1,...,p} and θ′
i > θi such that (θ1,...,θ′
i ...,θp) ∈






i. This would mean that (θ1,...,θ′
i ...,θp) ∈
S(x0), which is a contradiction with (θ1,...,θp) ∈ PS(x0), concluding then
(θ1,...,θp) ∈ PF(x0).
29For proving the reverse inclusion PF(x0) ⊂ PS(x0), consider (θ1,...,θp) ∈
PF(x0). Since PF(x0) ⊂ F(x0) ⊂ S(x0) we get that (θ1,...,θp) ∈ S(x0). If
(θ1,...,θp) / ∈ PS(x0), there exist some i ∈ {1,...,p} and θ′
i > θi such that
(θ1,...,θ′
i ...,θp) ∈ S(x0), and therefore there is a trajectory of decisions a( )












This would mean that (θ1,..., ˜ θi,...,θp) ∈ F(x0), which is a contradiction
with (θ1,...,θi,...,θp) ∈ PF(x0) concluding then (θ1,...,θp) ∈ PS(x0) .
2
Proof of Proposition 3.
Under the axiom of Pareto eﬃciency, a solution θ ∈ S(x0) belongs to
PS(x0). According to Proposition 2, this means that θ ∈ PF(x0) ∈ F(x0).
Given the axiom of Independence of irrelevant alternatives and Proposition
1, θ is also the solution of the dynamic bargaining problem on F(x0). 2
Proof of Proposition 4.
We have to show that for an initial state x0, if the vector of thresholds
θ = (θ1:k,θk+1:p) belong to S(x0) then, a⋆(t) = a⋆
θk+1:p(x(t)) deﬁned in (6) is
a decision rule that allows to obtain at least θ.
Take θ = (θ1:k,θk+1:p) ∈ S(x0) and a sequence of decisions a(t0),a(t0 +
1)... that allows to guarante these thresholds. Since θ ∈ S(x0), the decision
a⋆
θk+1:p(x0) is well deﬁned (the inﬁmum is taken over an nonempty set) and
(from the deﬁnition of a⋆
θk+1:p( ) in (6)), we have that a(t0) ≥ a⋆
θk+1:p(x(t0))
and therefore, due to g is decreasing in the decision variable, we obtain that
x
⋆(t0 + 1) = g(x(t0),a
⋆
θk+1:p(x(t0))) ≥ g(x(t0),a(t0)) = x(t0 + 1) .
As above, in the following we will denote by x⋆( ) and x( ) the trajecto-
ries of the states generated by feedback decisions a⋆
θk+1:p and decisions a( )
respectively.
30Since indicators Ii, i = k + 1,...,p, are increasing with the state x, we
can see in (6) that a⋆
θk+1:p(x) is decreasing with the state x. Hence
a(t0 + 1) ≥ a
⋆
θk+1:p(x(t0 + 1))
by deﬁnition of a
⋆
θk+1:p because







θk+1:p( ) is decreasing in the state variable .
We thus obtain that
x






⋆(t0 + 1),a(t0 + 1))
because the dynamics g is decreasing in the control variable
≥ g(x(t0 + 1),a(t0 + 1))
because the dynamics g is increasing in the state variable
= x(t0 + 2) .
Recursively we can conclude that x⋆(t) ≥ x(t) and a⋆
θk+1:p(x⋆(t)) ≤ a(t) for
all t ≥ t0.
On the other hand, by assumption, the indicators I1, ..., Ik are increasing




















≥ θi by deﬁnition of
a⋆
θk+1:p which allows to conclude the desired result.
Finally, if a⋆
θk+1:p is a common decision rule that allow to obtain at least
θ = (θ1:k,θk+1:p), obviously θ ∈ S(x0). 2
31Proof of Proposition 5.
For θ = (θ1,...,θp) = (θ1:k,θk+1:p) in S(x0) we ﬁrst prove that the in-
equalities θi ≤ Θi(θk+1:p,x0) for i = 1,...,k hold. From the deﬁnition of





˜ x(t + 1) = g(˜ x(t),a(t)), t = t0,t0 + 1,...
˜ x(t0) = x0
satisﬁes
Ii(˜ x(t),a(t)) ≥ θi i = 1,2,...,p t = t0,t0 + 1,.... (12)
Since Ii(x0,a(t0)) ≥ θi, for i = k + 1,...,p, from the deﬁnition of a⋆
θk+1:p
one has a(t0) ≥ a⋆
θk+1:p(x0) which, from (12) (for t = t0) and monotonicity







≥ θi i = 1,...,k .









, t = t0,t0 + 1,...
x(t0) = x0
(13)
inductively we can prove that a⋆
θk+1:p(x(t)) ≤ a(t) and x(t) ≥ ˜ x(t) for all











≥ θi i = 1,...,k, t = t0,t0 + 1,...
implying θi ≤ Θi(θk+1:p,x0) for i = 1,...,k.
For the reverse inclusion in (8), take θ = (θ1:k,θk+1:p) ∈ Rp. If θ1:k ≤
Θ1:k(θk+1:p,x0), from he deﬁnition of Θi(θk+1:p,x0) in (9), we have that the







≥ Θi(θk+1:p,x0) ≥ θi i = 1,...,k, t ≥ t0
32and, from deﬁnition of a⋆







≥ θi i = k + 1,...,p, t ≥ t0
concluding that θ = (θ1:k,θk+1:p) ∈ S(x0), because the common decision rule
a⋆
θk+1:p is admissible for θ. 2
Proof of Proposition 6
Let us start proving the inclusion











In order to do that, we need the following Lemma.
Lemma 1
Assume that the dynamics g and the indicators I1,...,Ip are MONDAIk for
some k ∈ {1,...,p − 1}. Let θk+1:p and σk+1:p be two vectors of partial
thresholds such that θk+1:p ≤ σk+1:p. Then,
  σ1:k(σk+1:p,x0) ≤ Θ1:k(θk+1:p,x0), (14)
where, for a ﬁxed set of thresholds θk+1:p = (θk+1,...,θp) (resp. σk+1:p =
(σk+1,...,σp)), the vector Θ1:k(θk+1:p,x0) (resp.   σ1:k(σk+1:p,x0)) is given by
(9).
Proof of Lemma 1








are in S(x0). For θk+1:p and σk+1:p, we consider the
associated decision rules a⋆
θk+1:p and a⋆















˜ x(t0) = x0





t = t0,t0 + 1,...,








≥ σi ≥ θi i = k + 1,...,p
and, from the deﬁnition of a⋆
θk+1:p one has a⋆
σk+1:p(˜ x(t0)) ≥ a⋆
θk+1:p(x(t0)).
Therefore,












= ˜ x(t0 + 1).
Inductively we can prove that
x(t) ≥ ˜ x(t) and a
⋆
σk+1:p(˜ x(t)) ≥ a
⋆














i = 1,...,k t ≥ t0.






∈   S(x0) and σ = (σ1:k,σk+1:p) such
that





From Lemma 1, we have
  σ1:k(σk+1:p,x0) ≤ Θ1:k(θk+1:p,x0). (16)
If σ ∈ S(x0), Proposition 5 allows us to conclude
σ1:k ≤   σ1:k(σk+1:p,x0).
34The above inequality, together with (16), is a contradiction with (15), con-







PS(x0) ⊂   S(x0),
take θ = (θ1:k,θk+1:p) ∈ PS(x0) ⊂ S(x0). From Proposition 5 we get
θ1:k ≤ Θ1:k(θk+1:p,x0).
Since (θk+1:p,Θ1:k(θk+1:p,x0)) ∈ S(x0) and θ = (θ1:k,θk+1:p) ∈ PS(x0) we con-
clude that θ1:k = Θ1:k(θk+1:p,x0), and then




∈   S(x0).
2
Proof of Proposition 7. The proof is similar (mutatis mutandis) to
that of Proposition 3. 2
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